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Abstract. Economic articles are published very slowly. We believe this results mainly from
the poor incentives referees face. We recommend that an auction market replace the current
system for submitting papers and demonstrate a strict Pareto-improvement of equilibrium.
Besides the bene¯ts of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and
journals and rewards editors and referees for their e®ort.
In addition, the \academic dollars" for papers sold at auction go to the authors, editors
and referees of cited articles. This income indicates academic productivity (facilitating
decisions on tenure and promotion); its recirculation to journals further stimulates quality
competition.
The Manuscript Clearing House ...would reduce the social cost of informa-
tion to editors, authors and the subscribing public thereby generating con-
siderable e±ciency in the production and consumption of scholarly output.
By promoting competitive bidding for manuscripts, it would equalize returns
to scholarly output across ranks, improve the e±ciency of the academic job
market and tend to reduce alleged discrimination by journals. [...] Editors
would have far more information about the papers available on the market,
reducing duplication in publication, double reviewing and delay in collating
related papers. |Havrilesky (1975)
Many academics wish the Current Publishing System (CPS) worked better (Ellison, 2002b,a;
Colander and Plum, 2004). The need to reform is growing more urgent as pressure from
di®erent sources increases: Publications are more important for junior academics seeking
validation of their academic production but losing their value to senior academics annoyed
with problems in the system (Oswald, 2006; Ellison, 2007).
Some reforms address speed: The Berkeley Electronic Press urges reviewers to work faster
(\median decision time in 2006 was 27 days"). The Social Science Research Network sidesteps
Date: October 5, 2007. 9,100 Words.
Key words and phrases. Academic Journals, Academic Productivity, Market Design. JEL: A11, D02, D44.
Addresses: PrÄ ufer (j.prufer@uvt.nl) is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics, TILEC &
CentER at Tilburg University. Zetland (david@primal.ucdavis.edu) is a PhD Candidate at the Depart-
ment of Agricultural & Resource Economics at the University of California, Davis.
Thanks to Christopher P. Adams, Asl³han Arslan, Bryan Caplan, Aaron Edlin, Lapo Filistrucchi, Robin
Hanson, Chuck Mason, Charles Noussair, Quirino Paris, Steve Pressman, Alex Tabarrok and participants at
the Tilburg seminar for comments.
12 PRÄ UFER AND ZETLAND
the problem of reviewers, allowing authors to upload preprints for instant distribution. Oth-
ers change the reviewer's role: Open-source peer-review allows anyone to comment (Zamiska,
2006); Tsang and Frey (2006) suggest an \As-Is Review", i.e., editors accept or reject based
on referee comments, but authors choose which revisions to make. Each of these ideas fails
to address the main problem: referee incentives.
We propose auctions|with revenue sharing|to ¯x incentives. Although we worked out
\our" auction idea before discovering Havrilesky's undeservedly-forgotten article, we are
honored to resurrect his idea. Besides improving incentives, our Auction Market for Journal
Articles (AMJA) improves article-journal matching, article quality and publication speed.
Because prices exist, the AMJA provides a measure of the academic productivity of authors,
editors/journals and referees.
The AMJA works as follows: In period zero, the author writes, markets and submits his
paper to the AMJA auction server. In period one, editors screen and value papers. In period
two, editors bid for papers. Winning bids|in \academic dollars"|go to the authors, editors
and referees of articles cited in auctioned papers. In period three, referees review papers,
and editors decide to accept or reject papers in period four.
In the next section, we describe the pros and cons of the CPS. In Section 2, we put the
CPS and AMJA in the same model framework. We analyze the AMJA game in Section 3
and compare its equilibrium with the CPS equilibrium in Section 4, showing how the AMJA
equilibrium is a strict Pareto-improvement on the CPS equilibrium. In Section 5, we discuss
some aspects of the AMJA not explicitly in the model. We conclude with a discussion of
how the AMJA improves valuation of articles and feedback on journals' service to authors
and referees. Interesting, but peripheral, logistical details are in the Appendices.
1. Incentive Problems in the Current Publishing System
Science demands recognition of the fact that exclusive review procedures pro-
mulgated by editors work to their and to the referees' decided advantage,
not to that of potential authors. The basis for this policy is more one of
convenience, power, and control than ethics. |Szenberg (1994)AN AUCTION MARKET FOR JOURNAL ARTICLES 3
An editor's job is triage, but he is unpopular since he rejects 75 percent of
the submissions, sends papers for review to people who are too busy and then
badgers those reviewers. |Pressman (2005)
...an active discussion among economists could reveal a lot about whether
the current system maximizes the utility of those involved or whether an
alternate system might make economists' lives more enjoyable and research
more productive. |Ellison (2002b, p. 990)
In the CPS, an author chooses and submits his paper to one journal. This choice matters:
Shoot too high and su®er delay before rejection;
1 shoot too low and waste an opportunity
to publish well (Oster, 1980). According to Judge et al. (2007), the single most important
factor determining an article's popularity is not how well it's written, who the author is,
or the originality of the idea|it's the prestige of the journal publishing it. If true, authors
are right to worry about appropriate placement. Unfortunately, bias in favor of their own
brilliance ensures they shoot too high more often than too low, wasting everyone's time.
The editor receives papers pushed by authors. If the editor does not \desk-reject" the
paper, he chooses one or more referees to review it. Their reviews help the editor decide to
accept or reject the paper. Although all parties to the process are trying to do the right
thing, editors and referees make mistakes in rejection (or acceptance).
2 These mistakes arise
from the characteristics and incentives of the CPS: Authors push papers at editors, who have
a temporary monopoly on review by referees who receive little credit for their work.
Let us look at the CPS from the perspectives of each actor, concentrating on the main
problem each faces.
3
Authors are unhappy because slow publishing delays decisions on tenure & prece-
dence and the debate, use & dispersion of their ideas: Submitting to the wrong jour-
nal increases the problems of delay. On the other hand, authors like the control and choice
1The average wait for rejection is eight months; thirty percent of articles accepted for publication had been
previously rejected by another journal (Hamermesh, 1994).
2Gans and Shepherd (1994) reported how (now) famous economists could not get their seminal articles
published. (Interestingly, Gans' article was \accepted before it was researched and published about a year
later" (Gans, 2004).)
3We ignore other parties (e.g., publishers and university administrators) to concentrate on the central players
in academic publishing.4 PRÄ UFER AND ZETLAND
they have in the CPS: They push their papers to the journals they want. They also like
getting \free" review services, although this is an obvious, negative externality for referees
and editors.
4
Editors are unhappy because authors push papers at them: They choose neither the
quality nor volume of incoming papers, regularly reject authors, have the burden of a®ecting
others' careers, struggle to get e®ort from referees, are paid little, and sometimes doubt the
sincerity of those who claim to be friends. On the other hand, power and prestige bene¯t
editors' own research and careers.
Referees are unhappy because they work for \free": Their reputation doesn't improve
because their work is anonymous to most; editors push them; and they are constantly ¯nding
problems|not solutions|in papers they review. On the other hand, referees are happy
because they receive \credits" from editors for future, favorable treatment of their own
work; they give back as a member of the academic community; and they have power from
insider information.
Readers are unhappy because the CPS is too slow|recent publications do not re°ect
state-of-the-art research
5|and the CPS system of matching papers to journals by
quality is too inaccurate: Although all articles in a given journal are good, not all good
articles will be in that journal, either because they are published in another journal (increas-
ing search costs) or because they are still in-press (increasing waiting costs) (Starbuck, 2005;
Chow et al., 2006; Oswald, 2007). On the other hand, readers are happy because journals
¯lter and rank articles from a much larger pool of papers|improving them (presumably)
before publication.
Broadly speaking, authors and readers want a slow process to speed up but be more
accurate; editors want control over the papers they consider; and referees want rewards for
good work.
4Submission is not always free. Some journals have submission charges and/or require future referee reports.
5The proliferation of conferences and/or rise in registration fees may be partially-explained by publication
delay: As delay increases, the value of attending conferences rises.AN AUCTION MARKET FOR JOURNAL ARTICLES 5
Weak incentives for referees have perhaps the greatest adverse impact. Their rational
reaction|choosing minimal e®ort|leads to bad outcomes. Referees delay and/or avoid
work, argue with each other and fail to understand value (Szenberg, 1994; Starbuck, 2003).
6
They reject original, signi¯cant works that con°ict with current beliefs and favor papers
that echo their own results (Armstrong, 1997, 2002).
7 Referees' reviews have a low or neg-
ative correlation with subsequent citations; referees often miss the big picture, and over
three-quarters of their requested changes were based on \whim, bias or personal preference"
(Armstrong, 2002; Starbuck, 2005). If there is one thing to ¯x, it is referee incentives. In
the next section, we suggest how.
2. How Auctions Fix the Problem|a Simple Model
Some notes on terminology: First, we discuss a system that serves academics with main-
stream preferences in the dimensions we cover, i.e., average readers, authors, editors, and
referees. Although preferences within these groups are likely to be heterogenous, we do not
discuss implications for players with non-average preferences. Second, we de¯ne variables
and parameters with all subscripts; in later use, we drop subscripts whenever possible to
reduce clutter.
2.1. Induced Utility and Cost Functions. We characterize the induced utility functions
of the four parties involved in the publication process by quantifying the main arguments
mentioned in Section 1. The average reader/consumer C values article quality and publica-
tion speed, i.e.,
ºC = uC(Qj;Tj); (1)
6Garcia-Berthou and Alcaraz (2004) sample articles in Nature and the British Medical journal, identifying
one or more statistical errors in 38 percent of the articles. In four percent of the cases, \the conclusion would
change from signi¯cant to nonsigni¯cant" [p. 3]
7We have personal knowledge of a case where the referee for a prestigious journal recommended rejection of
a paper that corrected a fatal mistake in the referee's own article in the same journal. The editor accepted
the referee's opinion. That paper is now in limbo.6 PRÄ UFER AND ZETLAND
where the utility of reading articles (uC) is increasing in the average quality of articles in
journal j (Qj) and decreasing in time-to-publication of journal j (Tj).
We assume that any competitive publication system|in equilibrium|publishes high-
quality papers in high-reputation journals; this condition solves the reader's asymmetric
information problem, i.e., judging the quality of an article before he spends a reasonable
amount of time reading it.8 We also assume that the career prospects of author i positively
depend on the reputation of a journal publishing article i; see Judge et al. (2007).9 Hence,
average author i prefers to produce a paper with high quality.10 He also prefers speedy
publication, i.e., low Tj. For production of a paper with quality qi and marketing the paper
with e®ort mi, the author bears costs of ai(qi;mi), which are convex in both arguments.11
The author's induced utility is:12
ºi = ui(qi;Tj) ¡ ai(qi;mi): (2)
An average editor j values the power and prestige of his journal, which is a function of
average article quality (Qj).13 The editor incurs costs in his job: the cost of preliminary
review for submitted papers (sj), the cost of choosing a referee for papers that survive
preliminary review (rj), and the cost of ¯nalizing papers for publication (fj). We assume
cost functions sj(¢), rj(¢) and fj(¢) are convex in the number of papers at each stage to re°ect
8If the reputation ranking of a journal is a rough indicator of the quality of its articles, journals provide a
public good to the academic community, i.e., paper preselection and vertical classi¯cation. (This is a public
good because the journal publishers cannot charge every consumer of the good, i.e. all readers know the
table of contents at little or no cost.)
9We assume that author and paper are paired only with each other; thus we refer to both with the same
subscript i.
10Many authors produce high quality for other, extrinsic or intrinsic reasons. Since these reasons complement
career goals, we ignore them.
11Marketing refers to presenting at conferences or seminars, sending emails, posting to preprint servers and
listservs, soliciting reviews from colleagues, etc. (Armstrong, 2002, p. 78).
12Costs of quality production and marketing are convex because of increasing opportunity costs, e.g., time
away from other work.
13We assume that editor and journal are paired only with each other; thus we refer to both with the same
subscript j.AN AUCTION MARKET FOR JOURNAL ARTICLES 7
increasing opportunity costs. Thus, the editor's induced utility function is:
ºj = uj(Qj) ¡ [sj(¢) + rj(¢) + fj(¢)]: (3)
An average referee R of journal j obtains utility uR from expected preferential treatment
for his next submission to that journal. A referee can invest e®ort e ¸ e > 0 in judging and
improving a paper for a cost represented by the convex function cR(e). e is the minimum
e®ort necessary to deliver a referee report that satis¯es the editor; i.e., we assume the editor
and referee both know when a report is unsatisfactory. Since one characteristic of report
quality is speed, we assume that higher e speeds publication, i.e., @T
@e < 0. uR is positively
dependent and concave in e. The induced utility of a referee is:
ºR = uR(e) ¡ cR(e): (4)
2.2. The Auction Market for Journal Articles (AMJA) Game. Authors write papers,
market them to editors, and post them for auction. Editors bid Academic Dollars (A$) for
papers (see Appendix B on page 29 for a discussion of A$.), and assign \purchases" to
referees.14 Referees put in e®ort to review and improve papers. After publication, readers
read and cite articles (published papers) in their own work. When those readers' papers are
subsequently auctioned for A$, the redistribution of A$ to the authors, editors and referees
of articles cited in subsequently-auctioned papers rewards quality.15 Figure 1 on the next
page displays the °ow of a paper and A$. The detailed timing of auctions is as follows:
Period t0|Author Writes/Markets Paper: Author i writes paper i with quality qi ´ q for
a cost of a(q) and makes the exogenous decision to post it on the auction server, for an
exogenous submission fee of Á (in US$, not A$). The author speci¯es:
14Throughout this paper, we say that papers are purchased, optioned, and/or won at auction. Strictly
speaking, bidders in the AMJA option the exclusive right to consider a paper for publication. Publication
is not required, and ownership still resides with the author.
15Say, for example, Paper 1 is auctioned for 100A$. Since it cites 10 older articles, the authors, editors and
referees of each cited article divide 10A$. When Paper 2|citing Paper (now Article) 1 and 19 others|sells
for 120A$, Article 1's author, editor and referee split 6A$ according to their prior agreements.8 PRÄ UFER AND ZETLAND





Period 0: Author posts
Periods 1 & 2: Editors 
screen & bid A$
A$ to cited articles
Period 3: Referee reviews 
Period 4: Editor accepts or rejects
Rejected
Optioned
Figure 1. Market Structure from Auction to Publication. In Period 2, auc-
tion proceeds go to prior cited articles. The auctioned paper receives revenue
after publication, when papers citing it (as an article) are themselves auc-
tioned.AN AUCTION MARKET FOR JOURNAL ARTICLES 9
(1) a reserve price,
(2) positive/negative \handicaps" on bids from particular journals (allowing the author
to integrate his preferences for certain publication outlets),
(3) the maximum time he will wait for a ¯nal acceptance/rejection decision from the
editor who wins the paper at auction,
(4) a minimum share of future revenues from the article, and
(5) to remain anonymous.16
Since authors specify these ¯ve criteria outside of the game, we treat the author's share
of future revenues from the article (1 ¡ ®) and total time from submission of a paper to
the auction server to ¯nal acceptance/rejection decision (T) as exogenous variables.17 The
author decides marketing e®ort (m), which has a cost of a(m).
Period t1|Editor Screens Papers: Editor j of journal j already knows about the set Kj ´ K
papers, where K is a random draw from the much larger set (1) available on the auction
market; see Figure 2. He decides jLj, the number of papers in set L µ K, at a cost of s(jLj).
In doing so, he learns his willingness to pay (vij ´ v) for each of the jLj papers. v depends
on the expected revenue of an article (^ ¼), which di®ers among editors and is drawn from an
arbitrary distribution.18 Let ¹ denote the probability that the editor's valuation is positive,
i.e., Probfv > 0g ´ ¹:19 We normalize valuations such that editor j only has a valuation
v > 0 for a paper if his prior after spending s(¢) on it is that he is willing (in principle) to
16Acceptance rates and referee ratings are lower and more critical when the reviewer is unaware of the
author's identity, which is only 55 percent of the time (Blank, 1991, pp 1041-2).
17Diversity in these variables can correct for author and editor/journal heterogeneity. Duration T could
be split into a standard duration (T1) for the auction and a standard duration (T2) for the editors accep-
tance/rejection decision. Standardization at the auction server could minimize transaction costs, but °exible
Ts allow for various heterogeneities. Auctions should be frequent enough to allow editors several chances to
¯ll each issue of the journal. Although T2 might easily exceed the lapse between auctions, we do not consider
inter-auction dependencies here.
18To avoid combinatorial issues we assume that editor j0s valuation for paper i does not depend on his
valuation for paper l 6= i. If an editor wants to bid on related papers (e.g. to publish a one-topic issue),
he could increase his valuation for paper i by adding a value component to ^ ¼ that depends on his expected
probability of winning the other papers. Alternatively, papers could be bundled at auction.
19The probability for positive valuations varies among editors: An editor of a high-quality journal might not
want to publish the same paper an editor of a lower-quality journal would; see more about private values on
page 14.10 PRÄ UFER AND ZETLAND
Figure 2. In the CPS [left], editor j makes a preliminary review of subset
W in the set of submitted papers N. He sends a subset H µ W to referees for
review and accepts X µ H. In the AMJA [right], each editor has a set K of
\known" papers in the much larger set (1) available on the auction market.
He \learns" about (and sets a value on) an endogenous subset L. He wins a
subset (M µ L) at auctions and sends them to referees and accepts X µ M.
publish that paper. Publication will not occur if the editor wins a \better" paper at auction,
and both papers compete for the same space in journal j.
Period t2|Editor Bids on Papers: Editor j submits a single bid of bij ´ b for each paper
in L. A$ bids are not published. This sealed-bid, second-price (Vickrey) auction ends at
the pre-speci¯ed time after which the highest and the second-highest bids are known. The
highest bidder wins and pays the price p = ^ b, where ^ b is the second-highest bid.20 p is
distributed equally among the editors of the articles cited by i (who then split their shares
with referees and authors of those articles). Editor j wins a set of papers M µ L. He has
the right to accept or reject those papers before T ends.21
Period t3|Referee Reviews Paper: The editor incurs costs r(jMj) to ¯nd a referee willing
to review the papers he has optioned for a share (¯) of future revenues (¼ij ´ ¼)|should
the editor publish the paper.22 The referee chooses e®ort e to judge/improve the paper and
recommend its acceptance or rejection.
20These auction rules guarantee maximum anonymity of bidders and bids|and thereby solve the typical
problems of auctions with common or a±liated values and sniping; see Section 3 for more details. Without
loss of generality we also use ^ b to denote the expected bid of the second-highest bidder.
21Authors pre-specify the bidders they would refuse via Period 0 handicaps.
22We assume ¯, like ®, is exogenous. In practice, ¯ results from a bargaining process that integrates referees'
heterogenous quality and standing.AN AUCTION MARKET FOR JOURNAL ARTICLES 11
Period t4|Editor Accepts/Rejects Paper: We de¯ne X as the set of papers ¯nally accepted
for publication in a given issue of journal j and jXj as the number of slots available for
articles.23 Given jXj, we de¯ne ° as the share of papers the editor can accept out of the jMj
won at auction, i.e., jXj ´ °jMj.24 The editor accepts and ¯nalizes for publication the best
°jMj papers at a cost of f(°jMj); he rejects (1¡°)jMj. This decision involves no additional
e®ort and therefore no optimization trade-o®.
2.3. Quality Production and Article Revenues. Before we solve the AMJA Game, let
us specify Qj ´ Q, the average quality of accepted papers in journal j.25 Q is a function of
the quality of papers authors submit to the auction (q), referee e®ort (e), and the journal's
acceptance rate (°). As Q is the average quality of papers in X, a subset of 1, in expectation
it positively depends on qi, a single paper's quality, where i 2 1. As the increased quality
of an individual paper translates monotonically into increased average journal quality, we
assume that q has a non-convex impact on Q. As a referee's work can increase a paper's
¯nal quality and partly substitute for its original quality, e has a similar e®ect on Q as q.
The editor can rank the jMj papers he has optioned for publication after spending s(¢),
r(¢) and reading referee reports. As long as he chooses to publish the best of those papers,
which is in his interest, a lower acceptance rate (°) results in higher average journal quality,
ceteris paribus. For simplicity, we assume a linear relation such that ° positively depends on
the exogenous number of slots in a given journal issue (jXj) and negatively on the number
of papers the editor options in the auction market (jMj). We assume jMj increases mono-
tonically in jLj, the number of papers an editor bids on, because each non-zero bid increases
the probability of placing the highest bid for a paper and winning its auction.26 Formally,
23We ignore the fact that papers di®er in length.




25This de¯nition allows us to use Q as the \quality of journal j" as well.
26If editor j spends s0 on paper i and learns that his valuation v = 0, he has a dominant strategy of bidding
b = 0. As the editor's prior on his expected valuation for a given paper in K must be positive (otherwise
he would be a useless editor), a marginal increase in jLj|while assuming that the quality standards of the
editor, expressed by ¹, are constant in jLj|increases the probability of ¯nding a paper on the auction market
for which v > 0. For each such paper, as we will see below, his optimal bidding strategy is b¤ = v > 0.12 PRÄ UFER AND ZETLAND
we operate with the following Equations:
































Equation (5) characterizes the production function of journal quality. Equations (6), (7)
and (9) capture the marginal e®ects of the e®orts of authors, referees and editors on the
production of journal quality. Equation (8) is necessary to understand (9).
We make the crucial assumption|following Judge et al. (2007)|that an article's citation
revenues monotonically increase in the quality of the journal in which it appears. Formally,
let i be one of G papers that cites article ij, let pi be the price of i in a future auction, and
let ni be the number of articles cited in i. Then, abstracting from time discounting, article







As revenues will be made in the uncertain future, we denote the expected revenues of









Combine this with our assumption that the sets of known papers of editors j and k (Kj and Kk6=j) are
random draws from 1. (Thus probfKj ´ Kk6=jg = 0.) We conclude that an increase in jLj increases the
probability that editor j places the highest bid for a paper and thereby increases jMj.AN AUCTION MARKET FOR JOURNAL ARTICLES 13




Summarizing Equations (6), (7), (9) and (11), we get:
Lemma 1 (Expected revenues of an accepted paper).
The expected revenue of an article (^ ¼) is increasing in the quality of the paper an author
submits to the auction (q), the e®ort of a referee to improve the paper (e), and the number
of papers an editor chooses to learn about (jLj).28
3. Analysis of the AMJA Game
We ignore the possibility of zero strategies and look for a subgame-perfect equilibrium that
provides positive outcomes.29 Since there is no optimization in t4; we start with the referee's
optimization problem in t3 where the referee faces a moral hazard problem concerning ac-
ceptance or rejection of the paper he is to review: Since he will only get a payo® if the paper
is published, he is unlikely to recommend rejection.30 If so, the editor making acceptance
decisions in t4 could use his own ranking of papers within jMj that he got from spending s0(¢)
in t1 and could compare the arguments the referee provides with the arguments of another
referee in favor of another paper. We conclude that the recommendation of the referee in a
one-shot game does not contain useful information for the editor. This does not imply that
the referee is useless: He improves the quality of the paper.
27We assume non-convexity to re°ect the fact that journals do not have increasing returns to scale. This is
evident in the emergence of more, not bigger, journals in response to the multiplication of ¯elds and demand
for publication space. The most recent manifestation is the AER's spawning of four ¯eld journals.
28We call papers \accepted" when they are won at auction and \articles" after they are published.
29One obvious subgame-perfect equilibrium of the AMJA game is a strategy combination in which no party
exerts any e®ort, i.e., a zero equilibrium where authors invest q = m = 0; editors learn about jLj = 0 papers
and bid b = 0 for each paper in an empty set L; referees pick e = e but su®er no refereeing disutility because
editors send them no papers. No papers are published, and all four parties enjoy induced utility of zero.
Nobody has an incentive to deviate as publishing papers is only feasible cooperatively.
30In a repeated version of the game such a proposed pooling equilibrium, where all referees recommend
acceptance, is not necessarily stable; referees could build a reputation for honesty and seriousness by rejecting
a higher share of papers without e®ort; see Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for modeling possibilities that we
ignore here.14 PRÄ UFER AND ZETLAND
Recall that ® is the journal's share of future revenue ^ ¼, of which the editor gives the share
¯ to the referee. This share extends the objective function of the referee in Equation (4).
Therefore, the referee chooses e®ort e¤ to solve the optimization problem:
max
e
®¯^ ¼(e;¢) ¡ cR(e) + uR(e), subject to e ¸ e: (13)
We know that referees work (choose positive e®ort) without explicit remuneration in the
CPS. Consequently we must have uR(e) ¸ cR(e):31 As the AMJA only adds utility to existing
CPS utility|from the same work, we have:
®¯^ ¼(e;¢) + uR(e) > cR(e): (14)
We know from Lemma 1 that ^ ¼ is increasing in e. From Equations (7) and (12), we know
the LHS of (14) is concave in e; the RHS, by assumption, is convex. This yields:
Lemma 2 (E®ort of the referee).
The optimization problem of the referee, Equation (13), has a unique and well-de¯ned solu-
tion, e¤ > e.
In period t2 the editor bids for papers. The value of a paper comes from two properties: a
private value for editors of certain journals and a common value for all editors.32 We avoid the
problems attached to auctions with common or a±liated values|and take advantage of the
heterogeneous, uncertain private values|by specifying a sealed-bid, second-price auction.33
Without knowing the mix of private and common values or other bidders' reputations, a
31This is a corollary to maximizing (13) when ^ ¼ = 0.
32Pure common value means that bidders have the exact same values for the item, e.g., an auction for $1. Pure
private value means that bidders' values are uncorrelated. It is through a±liation, i.e., positive correlation
between private values that these values become common, and bidders' strategies become interdependent
(Milgrom, 1989, p. 14). A±liation creates interdependent bidding strategies, which are analytically complex
(Klemperer, 2002).
33We could specify that bids be published ex post so bidders and authors can monitor the manager of the
auction platform but gain no useful information on strategies. Anonymizing bids would prevent others from
strategically using this information.AN AUCTION MARKET FOR JOURNAL ARTICLES 15
bidder cannot use others' bids to calculate common value or bid strategically.34 This leaves
the standard, optimal strategy for second-price, sealed-bid auctions: bidding private value:
b¤ = v.35 Conveniently, sealed bids also prevent shill bidding and sniping.36
Notice that budget constraints do not a®ect this strategy: If an editor bids b < v on some
papers because of a restricted budget, he only decreases his probability of winning those
papers; the price he pays in case of winning depends on the second-highest bid. As he does
not know the number or ¯nancial strength of other, bidding editors, there is no reason to
deviate from a strategy of b¤. If he runs out of A$, he simply has to stop bidding for further
papers.37
Private value v depends on expected revenues of an article (^ ¼), the editor's share of those
revenues (®(1 ¡ ¯)), the probability that a purchased paper will be published (°), and the
cost of ¯nding a referee (r0(¢)). As r(jMj) is convex, the editor estimates the number of
papers he will win as a function of number of positive bids, ¹L.
Let ^ jMj denote the expected number of papers the editor wins given he bids his valuation.
Since auctions for all papers run simultaneously within one period, the editor in equilibrium
will attribute the average cost of refereeing to each paper (
r( ^ jMj)
j ^ Mj ). Thus, we establish:
Lemma 3 (Editor bidding).
The optimal bid of editor j on each paper in L is
(i) b¤ = v = 0 if v · 0 and
(ii) b¤ = v = °®(1 ¡ ¯)^ ¼ ¡
r( ^ jMj)
j ^ Mj v > 0.
34A sealed-bid auction does not rule out the existence of common values: all editors want good papers.
Milgrom (1981) has shown that sealed-bid auctions prevent bidders from learning common values through
others' bids, resulting in lower bids (to avoid winner's curse) and sub-maximal revenue. Since this charac-
teristic a®ects all papers equally, and relative incomes do not change, we can ignore it. (Recall that our goal
is to allocate papers and value articles|not maximize revenues.)
35See, for instance, the proof in Klemperer (1999, Footnote 20).
36Shill bidding occurs when someone bids for the author to drive prices up. Sniping occurs when someone
bids just before the auction ends|and before others have a chance to react|and wins (Roth and Ockenfels,
2002).
37Beno^ ³t and Krishna (2001) show that this result changes if objects have common values and information
is complete.16 PRÄ UFER AND ZETLAND
Before the editor bids in period t1, he decides to give a preliminary review to jLj papers. He
learns his valuation (v) for all jLj at a total cost of s(jLj). His decision on jLj directly a®ects
the expected number of purchased papers (j ^ Mj) and hence the cost of choosing suitable





[®(1 ¡ ¯)^ ¼(jLj)] ¡
X
j ^ Mj
p + uj(Q(jLj)) ¡
h
s(jLj) + r(j ^ Mj(jLj)) + f(jXj)
i
; (15)
where ®(1¡¯)^ ¼ is the editor's share of expected total revenues of one of jXj papers published
as articles and
P
j ^ Mj p · j ^ Mj^ b denotes the expected price the editor has to pay at auctions
for the right to publish j ^ Mj papers. Note that f(jXj) is independent of jLj. The ¯rst-order



















Since Equations (9), (11) and (12) imply non-convex growth of ^ ¼ and linear growth of uj
and j ^ Mj in jLj, and s(jLj) and r(j ^ Mj) are convex, we can state:
Lemma 4 (Editor's optimal set of pulled papers).
The optimization problem of the editor, Equation (15), has a unique and well-de¯ned solution,
jLj¤ > 0.




·, the probability that paper i is among the papers known to editor j, where jK0
jj is the
number of papers known to editor j before author i's marketing decision. It follows that
·(m = 0) = 0, and · is concave in m: Given paper i 2 K, the probability that it is also
an element of L is
jLj
jKj, and the probability that j makes a positive bid for a paper in L is
¹. Finally, only ° of the papers purchased by editor j will be published and have a positive
expected revenue.
38See footnote 26 for more on the relation between jLj and jMj.AN AUCTION MARKET FOR JOURNAL ARTICLES 17
Let us de¯ne the expected publication probability of paper i (i.e., i's aggregate probabil-
ity over all journals j of receiving a bid b > 0, multiplied by the expected probability of












^ °k ´ ½: (17)
Author i considers all these factors in solving the maximization problem:
max
m;q
½[1 ¡ ®]^ ¼(q;¢) + ui(q;T) ¡ a(m;q) ¡ Á; (18)




























^ ¼ is independent of m; hence the LHS of Equation (19) is decreasing in mi, while its RHS
is increasing by the convexity assumption. Due to (6) and (12), the LHS of Equation (20)
is not increasing in q, while its RHS is increasing by assumption. Thus we establish:
Lemma 5 (Author's optimal e®orts to produce quality and marketing).
The optimization problem of the author, Equation (18), has one unique and well-de¯ned
solution, q¤ > 0 and m¤ > 0.
Notice that the LHS of Equation (19) depends on ^ ¼, which depends on q. Increased paper
quality q has a positive e®ect on optimal marketing e®ort m¤. Similarly, according to the
LHS of (20), the author's marginal expected revenue from increasing quality q increases in
marketing e®ort m (because
@½
@m > 0), i.e., optimal quality q¤ grows in m. Put another way,
quality and marketing are complements in the AMJA author's objective function|something
that is not necessarily true in the CPS. We summarize our results as:
39One could claim that ¹j positively depends on qi or negatively on Qj of the last round. Since we already
included e®ects of higher paper quality in ^ ¼, we assume ¹j is a ¯xed parameter.18 PRÄ UFER AND ZETLAND
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium of the AMJA publishing system).
Consider Lemmas 2 through 5. The unique, non-zero, subgame-perfect equilibrium of the
AMJA game is characterized by the strategies e¤, b¤, jLj¤, q¤ and m¤.
4. Comparing the CPS and AMJA
4.1. The Equilibrium of the CPS. First, we characterize the equilibrium of the current
publishing system (CPS). Consider the induced utility functions from Section 2.1: Equation
(4) denotes the objective function of a CPS referee. If we assume uR(e) is concave and cR(e)
is convex in e, the equilibrium strategy of a referee in a functioning CPS (i.e., uR(e) ¸ cR(e))
is to choose e®ort of:40
~ e ¸ e: (21)
A CPS editor's objective function is Equation (3). He chooses a set of papers (W) from
the exogenous set of papers pushed at him (N) and gives them preliminary reviews|at a
cost s(jWj)|within period T. Naturally, we assume the e®ects of jWj on jMj (the number
of papers being sent to referees|and hence on ° and Q|to be the same as those e®ects of
jLj; see Equation (9). If we assume uj is linear in jWj and s(¢) + r(¢) is convex in jWj, a
unique solution to his maximization is:
j ~ Wj > 0: (22)
In the CPS, an author's marketing e®ort does not improve the quality of his paper, the only
measure relevant when perfectly-rational editors consider papers pushed at them. This is
why ui is independent of m in a CPS author's objective function, Equation (2). Consequently,
equilibrium marketing e®ort is:41
~ m = 0: (23)
40We will denote equilibrium CPS values with a tilde, e.g., ~ e.
41Alternatively, one could claim that (as in reality) CPS authors also spend e®ort on marketing papers,
i.e., ~ m > 0. This marketing would increase the normalized marketing level and thus m¤; since the e®ect
in°uences both systems equally, it's irrelevant.AN AUCTION MARKET FOR JOURNAL ARTICLES 19
In contrast, q has a positive, non-convex impact on Q, which the editor values positively;
see Equation (6). ui(q;T) is therefore non-convex in q. Since the costs of quality (a(q)) are
convex in q, the unique equilibrium strategy is:
~ q > 0: (24)
Since there is no auction in the CPS, there is no bidding strategy. Our benchmark case
for the subsequent comparison is thus:
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium of the Current Publishing System).
Consider Equations (21) through (24). A unique non-zero, subgame-perfect equilibrium in
the CPS is characterized by the strategies ~ e, j ~ Wj, ~ m and ~ q.
4.2. Comparing Equilibria. Compare the referee's objective function in the CPS, Equa-
tion (4), to his objective function in the AMJA, Equation (13). The only di®erence is that
the referee gets additional utility in the AMJA, i.e., ®¯^ ¼(e;¢): Since
@®¯^ ¼(e;¢)
@e > 0, the referee's
equilibrium strategy in the AMJA is:
e
¤ > ~ e ¸ e: (25)
The comparison for editors is more complicated. To compare j ~ Wj and jLj¤, rewrite the
objective function of the AMJA editor in period t1, Equation (15), as:
X
jXj
[®(1 ¡ ¯)^ ¼(jLj)] ¡ jMj^ b + uj(Q(jLj)) ¡
h
s(jLj) + r(j ^ Mj(jLjj)) + f(jXj)
i
: (26)
Next, use jMj =
jXj
° and replace ^ b (the maximum price that editor j could have to pay for
each purchased paper) with his valuation v = °®(1¡¯)^ ¼¡
r( ^ jMj)
j ^ Mj ; see Lemma 3.42 Rewriting





+ uj(Q(jLj)) ¡ (s(jLj) + r(j ^ M(jLj)j) + f(X)): (27)
42For every price p < v the editor's incentive to increase jLj is even more pronounced.20 PRÄ UFER AND ZETLAND




j ^ Mj . When calcu-
lating the FOC of (27), note that
@°
@jLj < 0 (hence
jXj
° increases in jLj) and that
r(j ^ Mj)
j ^ Mj also
increases in jLj (from the convexity of r(¢)). Consequently, an editor gains more utility at
the margin from increasing jLj in AMJA than from j ~ Wj in CPS. This leads to:
jLj
¤ > j ~ Wj: (28)
For authors, compare the FOCs of the AMJA, Equation (20) with respect to q, and the
CPS, Equation (2). The only di®erence is that increasing quality gives the author in the







which is positive for m¤ > 0: This provides us with the insight that:
q
¤ > ~ q: (30)
Finally, we state as a corollary to Lemma 5 and Equation (23) that:
m
¤ > ~ m: (31)
These insights allow us to state two further results:
(1) According to Equations (6) to (9), the average quality of articles in a journal (Q)
increases in q, e, and jLj. Consequently, by considering the comparative results of
Equations (25), (28) and (30), we have:43
Q
¤ > ~ Q: (32)
(2) With e¤ > ~ e and, by assumption, @T
@e < 0, we have:
T
¤ < ~ T: (33)
43For clarity reasons we denote the AMJA (CPS) equilibrium value of Q by Q¤ ( ~ Q) and will do the same
for other variables below. We are aware that those are not strategic variables in the strict sense.AN AUCTION MARKET FOR JOURNAL ARTICLES 21
These results complete our equilibrium analysis.
4.3. Pareto-optimality. What claims can we make from our results about the well-being
of authors, editors, referees and readers? Ignoring the transition from one system to another
(see Appendix C on page 30), we compare the expected, induced utility of each party in
both systems.
Readers are better o® in the AMJA. Reader utility rises with journal quality (Q) and falls
with time-to publication (T). Since both equilibrium values improve in the AMJA system
(according to Equations (32) and (33)), we get:
º
¤
C > ~ ºC: (34)
Why do referees, editors, and authors choose higher values for e, jLjj, qi and mi in the
AMJA system? If players increase their inputs voluntarily|based on a comparison of ex-
pected marginal utility and marginal costs of such an increase, it must be because they
expect higher induced utility in the AMJA system.
This conclusion is simple for editors and referees because they only gain|and do not
lose|utility in the AMJA system, i.e.,
º
¤
j > ~ ºj (35)
º
¤
R > ~ ºR (36)
For authors, the AMJA is better only if additional induced utility exceeds additional
disutility, i.e.,
½(m
¤)[1 ¡ ®]^ ¼(q
¤) + (ui(T
¤) ¡ ui(~ T)) > Á: (37)
Thus, if the costs of posting a paper to the auction server (Á) are too high, authors will
not contribute. If authors di®er (e.g., thorough heterogenous abilities), they have di®erent
cost functions (a(q;m)) for increasing paper quality and marketing, which results in di®erent22 PRÄ UFER AND ZETLAND
levels of q¤ and m¤. To maximize participation, Á must be low enough to attract higher cost
authors.44
Finally, since author i voluntarily spends a(m¤ > 0) > 0, the author trades loss for gain
while Equation (37) holds.45 We conclude:
º
¤
i > ~ ºi; (38)
which allows us to state our main result:
Proposition 3 (Pareto-optimality).
Consider Equations (34) through (38). As long as the submission fee to the auction server (Á)
is su±ciently low, the equilibrium of the AMJA is strictly Pareto-superior to the equilibrium
of the CPS.
In the AMJA system, additional, explicit incentives induce referees to put more e®ort
into improving papers, editors to pull more papers for preliminary review (which frees other
papers from the idleness common in the CPS), and authors to put more e®ort into papers'
quality and marketing (given that submission fees are not prohibitive). As a result, we expect
the quality of journals to rise and publication delay to decrease. These developments directly
improve the well-being of readers, authors, and editors|and indirectly, via remuneration
from articles cited by subsequent, auctioned papers, the utility of referees.
44This insight opens an entire discussion on the potential goals (and welfare) of the academic community as
a whole: Is it better to encourage every author to post papers to the auction server by charging low Á|thus
allowing unsuccessful papers to subsidize more successful papers|or should a certain threshold for quality
of papers (and marketing e®orts) be set indirectly by charging high Á?
45Notice that there is a positive externality of m. Suppose an author writes a paper with high q. Increasing
m increases the probability that it is known to editors, who are more likely to give it a preliminary review
and bid for it. If this means journal quality (Q) rises to directly bene¯t readers and editors and ^ ¼ rises|
see Equation(11)|to indirectly bene¯t editors and referees, then e®ort spent on marketing a good paper
bene¯ts society. The contrary is also true: more marketing for a low-quality paper results in either no bids
(wasted marketing e®ort) or displacement of a better, but less marketed, competitor, which harms society
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5. Discussion
5.1. What about Errors in Deciding Bids (Value)? An editor's desk review assigns
values to jLj papers from the set K. Errors in establishing these values|due to mistakes
in the editor's judgement and/or stochastic elements in eventual, realized demand|means
that they vary from the true quality (value) of the papers. An editor is more likely to win
a paper when his positive error leads him to overestimate a paper's published value as an
article and thus to over bid; he is less-likely to win papers when negative errors lead him to
underestimate the paper's value.46
In the CPS, editors bene¯t from referee comments when considering value.47 AMJA editors
only have this bene¯t when and if they actually win the paper at auction. Holding all else
constant, an editor in the AMJA looking at the same set of papers as the editor in the CPS
is more likely to miss a few good ones and accept a few bad ones.
The cost of these mistakes in the AMJA is trivial: The auction price is slightly lower
(higher) for papers where the second price bid is under (over) biased. Since the real value of
the paper comes from future citations, the bid only a®ects revenue to cited articles. (If the
average article is cited a number of times, these errors cancel out.) For editors, mistakes in
over and underbidding will, similarly, balance out if other editors make mistakes at the same
rate. (An editor who makes too many mistakes exits in the long run.) For the author, a
mistake means placement in one journal and not another, but this e®ect will be small when
displacement is only a few ranks up/down the journal ladder; it disappears completely if the
paper ends up in a horizontally-equivalent journal or if readers read it µ a la carte.
In the CPS, the problem of under-estimated value is greater because the wait for rejection
is so long. In the AMJA, more eyeballs means fewer Type-I (mistaken rejection) and Type-II
(mistaken acceptance) errors; see, e.g., Gans and Shepherd (1994) and Oswald (2007).
46The harm from overestimating value will be smaller if the editor/referee/author endogenously increase
their e®ort to match the signal of a higher bid.
47The CPS advantage comes at a cost, since referees spend time (a negative externality) to grade all papers
in the CPS set H. CPS editor errors matter on the margin, when they desk-reject papers that should have
gone to referees.24 PRÄ UFER AND ZETLAND
5.2. How Will Editors Sort through All Those Papers? Editors in the AMJA must
sort through \all" papers in K, but they can use heuristics (¯lters, mailing lists, etc.) to
concentrate on papers they are likely to want. Specialist sub-editors can focus on papers
they know to be useful.
Since all editors see all papers simultaneously and bid for those they value, the AMJA
places papers more quickly and accurately. Although editors now have to ¯ght for papers
they previously got for \free", they also have a chance to get others' papers. (In the AMJA,
for example, editors could assemble special-topic issues by purchasing all the papers on a
particular topic.) Given that no journal has a consistent place in authors' rankings, this
competition is more likely to help all journals than hinder a single journal.
5.3. Additional, Unmodelled AMJA Bene¯ts. While the CPS uses a push mechanism
to place papers, the AMJA uses a pull mechanism. Pulling, like buying, has a lower psycho-
logical cost than pushing (selling).48 We expect that a referee, for example, is more likely to
favor a paper pulled by an AMJA editor than a paper pushed to a CPS editor.
Unlike the CPS, where rejection leads to resubmission elsewhere and a longer wait, authors
in the AMJA only wait until T to learn of acceptance/rejection. Even if T lasts as long as
the average review period in the CPS, placement under the AMJA is already optimal|at
least in terms of expectations. If there are no positive bids on a paper after T1, this sends a
clear signal to the author that he should invest more in quality and/or marketing|a signal
that rejection in the CPS does not produce.
6. Conclusion
We explore an alternative auction system for matching papers to journals. Because the
AMJA uses A$, it is possible to explicitly reward e®ort, which means that quality rises and
48Hagel and Brown (2005) note the e±ciency of pull models in an environment of uncertainty; Blois (2000,
pp. 205{208) states that customer pull is more e±cient when suppliers market directly to customers (not
via intermediaries). This case exists in the AMJA, where authors \sell" to editors/journals, not readers.
(Placement in a journal adds value in a public good sense, since the author can advertise placement without
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bene¯ts all participants. Because auctions clear the market in a limited time, they promise
faster, better matching.49
There is one aspect of the AMJA that is very important, yet ignored in the model: the
quanti¯cation of academic output via prices. Accurate valuation is more important than
ever for academics. Long ago, decisions on professional advancement depended on a number
of subjective factors. These were replaced over time by a greater reliance on \objective"
factors, such as publication or citation counts. As publication has grown more important,
the number of submitted papers has increased, leading|in turn|to a greater supply of
journals o®ering publication spaces.50 Far from ¯xing the problem, the multiplication of
titles has made measurement (and professional decisions) more di±cult. Neither tenure
candidates nor committees are happy with current evaluation methods (Varian, 1997); they
need a simple indicator.
In the CPS, departments may multiply articles (or pages) by the \rank" of the publishing
journal. The department may de¯ne rank (inviting provincial bias) or use ISI's \Impact
Factor" (inviting ISI's bias).
51 52 The most-accurate method multiplies citations of an
author's articles times the impact factor of the journals where citing articles appear. The
value of each article (i) is the average rank of the journals (j) where citing articles appear.





49We have, no doubt, left many questions unanswered; we explore logistical questions on bidding, A$ circu-
lation, transition from the CPS to the AMJA, and parallels to the multiple-submission method prevalent in
law reviews in the appendices.
50When publishers (both for-pro¯t and non-pro¯t) realized they could issue more journals without lowering
prices|since journals are complements and not substitutes|the number of journals exploded from about
120 in 1980 to almost 300 in 2000 (Bergstrom and Bergstrom, 2001; Plasmeijer, 2002). EconLit lists over
1,100 at http://www.econlit.org/journal_list.html|probably using a more inclusive de¯nition. Many
new journals deliver little value (Bergstrom, 2001).
51\The impact factor of a journal is calculated by dividing the number of current year citations to the source
items published in that journal during the previous two years. Example: A= total cites in 1992 B= 1992
cites to articles published in 1990-91 (this is a subset of A) C= number of articles published in 1990-91 D=
B/C = 1992 impact factor" (Gar¯eld, 1994); see Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) for another method.
52Thompson ISI has a monopoly on citation-tracking, mixes authors with the same ¯rst initials, is sloppy
about journal inclusion, fails to control for di®erent journal formats, and introduces within-journal citation
bias (Klein and Chiang, 2004).26 PRÄ UFER AND ZETLAND
The major problem with this metric is the bias within ISI's impact factor. An additional
problem is the assumption that all articles in a journal have the same, average value (the
journal's Impact Factor). For example, a citation from an excellent article in a \bad" journal
counts for less than a citation by a terrible article in a \good" journal. This method gives
prima facie inaccurate measures of value (Chow et al., 2006; Ellison, 2007; Oswald, 2007).
Oswald (2006) notes the problem is growing worse as the profession relies more heavily on
citations, which increases the incentive for manipulation.
Under the AMJA, an academic's output is the sum of his earnings (in A$) as an author,
editor and/or referee. The value of a journal is the sum of A$ earnings to articles that appear
in that journal. Since A$ will vary with an article's actual academic quality, these measures
are more accurate. Manipulation is also more di±cult, because aan article's value depends
on the auction prices of citing papers, not just the number of those papers.
The AMJA would improve paper placement, article quality and measurement of value.
Other bene¯ts (discussed in the Appendices) include a means to punish and/or reward
journal quality and the feasibility of migrating from the CPS. If successfully implemented by
economists, the AMJA's positive network e®ects would encourage expansion to other ¯elds,
media and participants.
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Appendix A. Auction Logistics
Shares: It not necessary to determine authors, editor and referee shares (f®;¯g 2
(0;1)) within the model. Since only editors \need" income (for future auction pur-
chases), authors and referees do not actually need to receive A$; all that matters
is the total A$ earned by articles they contribute to. (This case is equivalent to
® = 1;¯ = 0 in our model.)
Citations: Self-citations would not count in calculating the division of auction revenue
for a paper. Citations of friends/colleagues/co-authors would count, since determin-
ing the di®erence between legitimate and undeserved citations would be di±cult.53
Over-citing would decrease if citing authors want to maximize \rewards" to prior
contributions they admire; under-citing [plagiarism] would decrease if overlooked au-
thors have a reason (A$) to see their contributions acknowledged. Papers without
citations are rare; if one were to sell at auction, the revenue could be distributed to
all journals on some ex-ante, pro-rata basis.
Works cited that originate outside the auction system (books, unpublished pa-
pers and papers from other disciplines, newspapers, etc.) would not receive citation
revenue. (They might track \what if" A$ revenues as an indicator of value or oppor-
tunity cost from being outside the auction system. These types of virtual A$ would
indicate the most useful direction for AMJA expansion.)
Platform: We assume a single auction platform, which might create problems of mar-
ket power|or incompetence. Multiple platforms could coexist and compete (cf.,
competing stock exchanges) if A$ and information easily °owed between platforms.
Appendix B. Money Circulation
The AMJA uses Academic Dollars (A$)|not a liquid currency. The initial allocation of
A$ could be in proportion to a journal's subscriber-base, cumulative citations, impact factor,
53Although this allowance makes the practice of quid-pro-quo citations possible, that problem already exists
in the CPS.30 PRÄ UFER AND ZETLAND
etc. After each auction, A$ are allocated to the authors, editors and referees of cited articles
in proportion to their prior agreements. Editors use A$-income to bid for new papers.
Since authors and referees don't \need" A$, they reassign their A$ to any editor(s) they
choose within, say, one year. These insider votes strengthen good editors/journals and sup-
ports competition to serve the needs of authors and referees|in direct proportion to realized
author/referees success. (Minority and heterodox editors could bene¯t from a relatively loyal
constituency.)
A$ reallocation gives journals the incentive to increase their di®erentiation and quality,
which lowers search costs. If the journal's subscription price was \too high" relative to its
A$ revenue, it would lose readers and citations. Journals that charged \too little" could
choose between increasing price or building even higher readership.
The use of A$ limits the current problem of entry by publishers with \hot" money who
fragment the location of articles with small bene¯ts for readers, dubious bene¯ts to authors,
and great detriment to research libraries' budgets (Bergstrom and Bergstrom, 2001, 2004).
Entry would instead occur when authors/referees pooled their A$ to support a new journal.
Exit would take place when a journal failed to garner A$ support from authors/referees:
Regardless of ownership, the journal would die from \academic unpro¯tability".54
The ¯xed supply of A$ would limit in°ation in bidding and prices. Interestingly, an
editor's limited supply of A$ might limit the practice of excessive \banking" accepting so
many papers that \the time lag from acceptance to publication [rises] to 30 months or even
three years" (Dunleavy, 2003, pp. 231{2).
Appendix C. Transition from the CPS to the AMJA
Given that economics journals have the longest publishing delays, the natural place to
implement this idea is within economics (Ellison, 2002a, p. 998). How do we know it will
work? How can it be better than what we have? These worries, along with the fears that
54Cross-subsidies between journals would be transparent|allowing editors of \cash cows" to ¯ght back.AN AUCTION MARKET FOR JOURNAL ARTICLES 31
participants would game citation credits and that academics are adverse to being measured|
are perhaps over-cautious. Gaming and measurement are already abused (Oswald, 2006).
One or more journals might implement a pilot program by pooling submissions and then
allowing assistant editors to bid against each other. If a number of journals wanted to begin
an AMJA unilaterally, they could return auction revenue to participating journals only.
Other journals would have to agree to pool some or all of their submissions in the auction to
receive \their share" of citation revenue. The potential for A$ income is highest for journals
with stronger back-catalogs, providing a useful incentive for them to join the AMJA earlier.
Early support is especially valuable, since the AMJA has network e®ects/increasing returns
to scale technology (Oliver et al., 1985).
Appendix D. Multiple Submissions
The AMJA super¯cially resembles the multiple submission system common to law reviews
but di®ers in important ways; see Table 1.55 Pressman (1994) argues against the multiple
submission system, saying it does not reduce publication times (because reviews have limited
publication space); leads authors to play reviews against each other (thus reviews delay initial
acceptance); and burdens referees, who react to a lower probability of publication by giving
less e®ort.
Table 1. Comparing multiple submission to auctions
Multiple Submissions Auctions
Participation Push (Mandatory) Pull (Voluntary)
Competition Secret Open
Deadline None Predetermined
Allocation Author's Choice High Bidder
Reviewer E®ort Often Wasted Rewarded
Pressman's criticisms do not apply to the AMJA, since editors bid for papers only when
they want to ¯ll publication space; authors cannot game editors with a ¯xed deadline; referees
only review papers editors hold exclusively; and referees gain from a paper's success.
55Book publishers and universities handle multiple submissions for books and student applications, respec-
tively. Peters (1976) was the ¯rst to propose multiple submissions for academic journals.